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SUMMARY OF US POSITION ON WARNING TIME

1. Warning of a buildup to a postulated attack posture will depend on four factors:

a. The type or types of forces employed.

b. The occurrence and scope of preparatory measures.

c. NATO intelligence acquisition capabilities.

d. The rapidity with which warning is assessed and communicated.

2. A wide range of situations in which the Warsaw Pact might initiate offensive operations may be visualized, with possibilities extending from a surprise strategic attack with general purpose forces already in place, to an attack following a prolonged period of tension and a gradual deliberate buildup. In the case of the former situation the amount of warning could be measured in hours, if given at all. In the latter case, the "warning time" of the buildup and deployment of Warsaw Pact forces into an attack posture could amount to weeks, if not months.

3. The following pattern would be likely for an 80-division buildup prior to a nuclear attack:

a. Period of preparation prior to movement of units from USSR--5 to 8 days; detection possible but unlikely.

b. Time of movement--15 to 18 days; detection likely.

c. Deployment and assembly in forward area--1 to 2 days; detection likely.

d. Time for buildup--21 to 28 days. Estimate detection of buildup with 10 to 13 days after initiation, leaving 11 to 15 days warning time.

4. Warning times for possible scenarios are given in attached table.

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WARNING TO NATO OF A WARSAW PACT BUILDUP

Scenario	Size of Force (divs)	Warning Time	Comments
1. Surprise Nuclear Attack	37	0-12 hrs.	Surprise for the nuclear attack would be essential. Movement of general purpose forces prior to the nuclear attack would be very limited. They would attack in the wake of the nuclear attack rather than simultaneously with it.
2. Non Nuclear Attack without Mobilization-I	45	1-4 days	This attack would also be mainly with forces already in place with only limited reinforcements being provided mainly by the Soviet groups of forces in Poland and Hungary.
3. Non Nuclear Attack without Mobilization-II	60	4-10 days	Additional divisions and supporting air could be brought in from the USSR but there would be little opportunity to build up combat and service support. If all available East European forces were used, the warning time would be at the lower end of the range. With more Soviet forces, the warning would be greater.
4. Non Nuclear Attack with Mobilization-I	70	7-13 days	This situation allows for considerable reinforcement and filling up of units but stops the buildup at about 70 divisions, thus reducing the standard warning time of a major buildup.
5. Non Nuclear Attack with Mobilization-II	80	11-15 days	This situation takes maximum advantage of present Pact deployment and allows for the assembly and filling out of a Warsaw Pact force of about 80 divisions in 3 to 4 weeks. Should the buildup proceed at a slower pace, if, for example, the Soviets were to attempt some concurrent restructuring of their forces for a nonnuclear environment, the warning time could be greater.
6. Nuclear Attack with or without Mobilization			Warning time would be essentially the same as for scenarios 2 to 5 above.
7. Surprise Limited Attack with Limited Objectives	20	0-1 day	The extent of redeployment of forces and consequently the amount of warning would be limited by the requirement to gain surprise.

WARSAW PACT REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES IN THE CENTRAL REGION
AND WARNING TIME TO NATO

TOTAL FORCE (DIV)	BUILDUP TIME	WARNING TIME	AVERAGE WARNING TIME	COMPOSITION (DIVISIONS)									
				GSFG	EG	CZ	NGF	SGF	POL	SOV	TOTAL EEUR DIVS	TOTAL SOV DIVS	% EEUR DIVS
37	0 days	0-12 hrs	0	20	6	9	2	-	-	-	15	22	41%
45	3-7 days	1-4 days	3 days	20	6	9	2	4	4	-	19	26	42%
60	7-14 days	4-10 days	7 days	20	6	9	2	4	4/9	15/10	19/24	41/36	32%/40%
70	14-21 days	7-13 days	10 days	20	6	9	2	4	9	20	24	46	34%
80	21-28 days	11-15 days	13 days	20	6	9	2	4	9	30	24	56	30%

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